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Abstract 
This article analyses economic performance of Rwanda between 1973 and 2011. The economic 
history of Rwanda during this period can be divided into three periods i.e. pre-genocide period 
(1973-1989), inter-genocide period (1990-1994) and post—genocide period(1995-2011). Real 
GDP (constant 2000 US$) was used as the dependent variable and as a proxy for economic 
performance. The explanatory variables used were all xpressed as percentages of GDP. They 
included Domestic Investment (DI), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Domestic Savings (DS) 
and Trade (TR).Chow test based on data for the entire period (1973-2011) rejected the null 
hypothesis of no structural change/break. After exclusion of observations for the conflict and 
genocide period, the Chow test corroborated by the Wald test further showed strong presence of 
structural break for the pre and post genocide periods. The apparent existence of structural 
change for the two regimes suggests that the disequilibrium impact of genocide on the Rwandan 
economy was transitory. This could be explained by the interventions and policies initiated by 
post genocide leadership to develop, pacify and unite the people of Rwanda. Although structural 
change was established for the pre and post genocide periods, the change did not emanate from 
the shift in the intercept, but rather from slope vectors. This means the unobserved qualitative 
characteristics of the two regimes were similar but tha  the policies which led to changes in the 
explanatory variables impacted differently on performance in the two regimes. Incidentally, it 
was found out that the bulk of the difference in the models across the two regimes was explained 
mainly by changes in the intercept, DI and FDI.  
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The economic performance of Rwanda from 1973 to 2011 can be analysed as a historical 
transformation of three periods and two political regimes namely; the pre-genocide period, the 
period of conflict and genocide; and the post-genocide period. The main economic 
characteristics of the three periods are distinguishable as follows:  
 
1.1 1973-1989: This was the pre-genocide period where economic strategies were based on 
import substitution and industrialization policies. External balance on goods and services (% of 
GDP) declined from -1.8% in 1973 to -11.1% in 1989 while value addition in industry fell from 
3.6% to 2.8% for the same period. This period was also marked by rigid price and foreign-
exchange controls as well as high export taxes on coffee in order to raise revenue. This period is 
referred to in this paper as the first regime. 
 
1.2 1990-1994: This was the period in which the Rwandan economy was devastated by 
conflict and genocide of 1994. The horrendous human consequences of the conflict and genocide 
led to a huge drop in economic activity. This was also the period when most of the promised aid 
was cancelled, with donors citing government’s failure to meet conditions which included 
eliminating coffee price guarantees and adoption of structural adjustment programmes.  
 
1.3 1995-2011: This post genocide period is here referred to as the second regime. It was 
marked by reorganization of society, economic recovry and economic building (Bigsten and  
Yanagizawa, 2005). Different reforms were instituted and implemented to improve public 
administration, budgeting and financial management. These reforms among others included:  
privatization of public enterprises, creation of a system of public accounts, liberalization of the 
banking sector; and creation of different specialized institutions such as Rwanda Revenue 
Authority, Nation Tender Board, Auditor General and Anticorruption Commission. In 1999 tax 
on coffee exports was removed and the maximum tariffs reduced from 100% to 40%. Rwanda 
also joined the World Trade Organization and its economy then globalized. Since 2000, mid and 
long-term economic development strategies have beenadopted and implemented. These include 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), Economic Development and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (EDPRS) and Vision 2020. As a result of these efforts Rwanda’s economy grew at an 
average growth rate of 8.5% per year between 1995 and 2011.  
 
This article provides an analysis of the economic performance of Rwandan economy given the 
events that unfolded in Rwanda between 1973 and 2011. Using econometric techniques, this 
study investigates the existence of structural change/break in the performance of the Rwandan 
economy for the period (1973-2011). The stability analysis of GDP’s performance after the 
period of conflict and genocide (1990-1994) was analysed. All sources of possible structural 
breaks for the pre and post genocide periods were investigated. Finally, structural change under 









2. Literature review 
The variables adopted for this study are based on different researches on the determinants of 
economic growth undertaken by various authors. Analysed among the principal determinants of 
economic growth are direct investment and foreign direct investment (Fousekis & Shortle, 1995, 
Dollar, Iarossi & Mengistae, 2002 , Beddies, 1999, Ghura & Hadjimichael, 1996, Ghura, 1997, 
Hernandez-Cata, 2000, Ndikumana, 2000, Chari, et al. 1997, Collier & Gunning, 1999, Barro, 
1991, Khan & Reinhart, 1990, Wijeweera, Villano & Dollery, 2010). 
 
Savings as a key element in economic development/growth has also been analysed in several 
studies. These studies assume that higher savings lead to higher investment which in turn 
increases real output and employment if there are idle resources of labour, land and capital which 
can be absorbed in the economy (Lewis, 1970). Schmidt-Hebber, Serven & Solimano (1996) 
conclude that savings and growth reinforce each other and the causality runs from both 
directions. Ramesh (2011) shows that higher saving and investment lead to higher economic 
growth, but the reciprocal causality is not observed.  
 
Over the past years, the relationship between foreign trade and economic growth has been the 
debate of economic research in academia (Chen, 2009). Andersen & Babula (2008) concluded 
that there is likely to be a positive relationship between international trade and economic growth. 
Mehrara & Firouzjaee (2011) tested Granger causality relationship between nonoil export and 
economic growth based on panel cointegration analysis for 73 developing countries during the 
period 1970-2007. Their results show that there is bi-directional long-run causality between 
export and GDP growth. Ekanayake (1999) showed that bi-directional causality exists between 
export growth and economic growth in India, Indonesia, Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka 
and Thailand.  
 
Jayachandran & Seilan (2010) found Granger causality relationship from exports to growth rate 
with no causality relationship from growth rate to exports; and the direction of causality 
relationship from FDIs to growth rate with no causality relationship from growth rates to FDIs.  
Most of these studies emphasized Investment, Openness to Trade, Exports, Human capital, 
Domestic savings and Political factors as the principal determinants of economic growth. 
However due to their importance and relevance, thisstudy adopted Domestic investment, 
Foreign direct investment, Domestic savings and Trade s the main explanatory variables of 




The analyses of the economic performance of the Rwandan economy before and after the 1994 
genocide was based on World Bank (2012) data and covers a period of 39 years (1973-2011). 
The years 1973-1989 was considered the “pre-genocide” period while 1995-2011 was treated as 
the “post-genocide” era.  The years 1990-1994 is dubbed the “conflict and genocide” period 
when massive extrajudicial killings took place. Altogether there are 17 observations each for 
“pre-genocide” and “post-genocide” regimes and 5 observations for the period of “conflict and 
genocide”. 




Real GDP (constant 2000 US$) was the dependent variable adopted as a measure of economic 
performance. The variables used in the explanation of the economic performance were: 
Domestic Investment (DI) as percentage of GDP, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as percentage 
of GDP, Domestic Savings (DS) as percentage of GDP; and Trade (TR) as percentage of GDP. 
 
Stability tests or tests of structural break models were employed to analyze the economic 
performance between 1973 and 2011.  These tests are linear restrictions cast in terms of 
restricted and unrestricted residual sums of squares (RSS) of specified models. The tests are 
based on the F-statistic defined as 











Where *iRSS is restricted residual sum of squares, jRSS is the unrestricted residual sum of 
squares, *df is the degrees of freedom of the restricted model minus the degrees of freedom of the 
unrestricted model; and f is the degrees of freedom for the unrestricted model. 
 
The analysis of economic performance before (pre) and fter (post) the 1994 genocide was 
undertaken after dropping inter-genocide observations. The tests for identifying restricted and 
unrestricted RSS were obtained from a menu of the following models (Greene 2012, Ocaya 
2013, Johnston 1984): 
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Fixed Effects Model[ ]2 2 ( )Model RSS :  
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Separate regression Model [ 3 3 ( )Model RSS ]
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 Note that  3RSS is also equal to the sum of RSS obtained independently from regressions of each regim . 




Change in subset of Coefficients Model [ 4 4 ( )Model RSS ]
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Under the assumption that ( )21 2~ 0,N σε ,ε and  independently distributed, the RSS and the 
degrees of freedom associated with OLS estimation of these models will be used to carry out the 
Chow/structural change test for differential intercepts and differential slope v ctors. For the two 
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Where n is the total number of observations for pre and post genocide periods; and k   is the 
number of estimated coefficients from the pooled model7.  The restricted model for this test is 
model 1 while the unrestricted is model 3. The hypothesis is  
0 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
: ,  (there is no structural break/change)
: ,  (there is structural break/change)a
H
H
α α β β





The acceptance of the null hypothesis would suggest stability/similarity of the two regimes and 
justification of analysis based on a single pooled model. The rejection of the null hypothesis 
would not be informative since the structural change can originate from the intercepts, or the 
slopes, or both. The following tests would be necessary in order to establish the true source (s) of 
change arising from the rejection of the null hypothesis:    
 
3.1 Test of differential intercepts   













The F-statistic is obtained from  
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 Note in this model that     pre postandβ β are coefficient vectors of   pre postX and X respectively whileβ  is a  common 
coefficient vector for     pre postW and W . The   pre postX and X are changing (varying) variables while   pre postW and W  
are constant (non-changing) variable(s) for the two periods. 
7
 In E-Views the same test is conducted through stability tests with the appropriate breakpoint(s). Similarly, since the “pre” and 
“post” genocide number of observations are the same (balanced), the same test may also be obtained throug  the Wald coefficient 
test on the equality of the respective coefficients i  model 3.   
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3.2 Test of differential slope vectors 












The F-statistic for this test is  
( )2 3
3
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−  
3.3 Test of stability of subset of coefficients  
This test is based on the coefficients of variables a lowed to remain constant (i.e.,   pre postW and W  ).  The 




~ , ( 2 )
/( 2 )
RSS RSS q




 Where q is the number of coefficients in the subset of variables assumed to be constant (stable). 
Since the “pre” and “post” genocide number of observations are balanced, this same test may 
also be obtained through the Wald coefficient test on the equality of coefficients of variables 
allowed not to change (remain constant) in model 3.   
 
3.4 Test of structural change with unequal error variances (Heteroscedasticity of 
subsamples) 
This is a Wald test for a Chow/structural break test in large subsamples under the assumption 
that the “pre” and “post” genocide error variances are different9  
( ) ( )2 21 1 2 2i.e., ~ 0, ~ 0,N Nσ σ   ε , ε  
Under the null hypothesis of no  structural break the Wald statistic is given by 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )/ 1 . 2pre post pre post pre postˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ( )Asym kχ−− + − →V V W = θ θ θ θ  
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 Note also that the F-test can be obtained in E.Views through the Wald coefficient test on the equality of intercept dummies of 
the fixed effects model (model 2).  For balanced sub- ample observations, the same test is conducted in E-Views 7.0 and above 
by testing for redundant coefficients after estimation of the fixed effects model in panel option. 
 
9
 This test may also be viewed as a test of the appropriateness of applying Chow test to subsamples. 
 




Where pre postˆ ˆ and θ θ are consistent and asymptotically normally distributed estimators based on 
the “pre” and “post” genocide observations respectiv ly. The pre postˆ ˆ and V V  are the asymptotic 
covariance matrices based on the “pre” and “post” genocide estimators. 
 
4. Graphical analysis 
This section analyses trends of variables used in this study for the period 1973-2011. Real GDP 
(constant 2000 US$) for the post-genocide period (1995-2011) were much higher than those for 
the pre-genocide period (1973–1989). Having dipped during the year of genocide in 1994, the 
trend of real GDP (Figure 1) show that the post-genocide periods on the average increased two 
times over the pre-genocide periods. This change may be attributed to policies and programs 
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Real GDP in Rwanda (constant 2000 US$) in million
 
Figure 1: GDP (constant 2000 US$ in millions), Rwanda, 1973-2011. 
Source: World Bank, World development indicators, 2012. 
Figure 2 also shows that domestic investment as a share of GDP (DI) was also generally higher 
in the post genocide periods in comparison with the pre genocide periods. The trend indicate that 
DI plummeted during the year of genocide and gradually picked up thereafter due to renewed 
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Figure 2: DI as % of GDP, Rwanda, 1973-2011. 
Source: World Bank, World development indicators, 2012. 




Foreign direct investment (FDI) declined dramatically during the period of conflict and genocide 
and remained low for most of the earlier years of the post genocide period. This was largely 
associated with erosion of foreign investor confidence in the political stability of Rwanda. From 
2007, FDI increased significantly peaking in 2009 . This may be explained by measures 
government undertook to attract and promote foreign investment during this period. This among 
others included efforts in improving conditions of doing business (AfDB, AUC, & UNECA, 
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Foreign direct investment, net inflows in Rwanda(% of GDP)
 
Figure 3: FDI as % of GDP in Rwanda, 1973-2011 
Source: World Bank, World development indicators, 2012. 
 
Except for the slump in the year of genocide (1994), Figure 4 shows that domestic savings as a 
share of GDP (DS) has remained low and more or less the same for the pre and post genocide 
periods.  Domestic savings as percentage of GDP has continued to be very low with an average 
of 1.8% of GDP for all periods. This is associated with the poor culture of savings and lack of 
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Figure 4: DS as % of GDP, Rwanda, 1973-2011. 
Source: World Bank, World development indicators, 2012. 




Trade is measured as the sum of exports and imports. The trend of trade as percentage of GDP is 
given in Figure 5. Apart from the year of genocide when imports of goods and services 
substantially increased to address the challenges of conflict and genocide, there is no discernable 
difference in the pattern of trade between pre and post genocide periods in Rwanda. The share of 
exports compared to imports have remained very low thereby increasing Rwanda’s dependence 
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Figure 5: Trade as % of GDP, Rwanda, 1973-2011. 
Source: World Bank, World development indicators, 2012. 
 
5. Model estimation and Analysis10 
Analysis of real GDP performance in Rwanda was first carried out through the test for 
“structural break” for the entire period (1973-2011). The test was extended to the “pre” and 
“post” genocide period after excluding the period of c nflict and genocide (1990 -1994). Further 
tests were explored in order to establish possible sources of structural breaks after the period of 
conflict and genocide. Finally, a test of structural change under the heterogeneity (unequal 
variances) of the “pre” and “post” genocide periods was undertaken. 
 
5.1 Structural break for all the periods (1973-2011) 
The real GDP pooled regression results for the entire period (pre genocide, inter genocide & post 
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 Estimation and tests were carried out using EViews 5.0. 




Table 1: Pooled Regression estimates for all periods 
 
Dependent Variable: GDP  
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 1973 2011 
Included observations: 39 
    
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -1446.525 418.7610 -3.454298 0.0015 
DI 203.3175 21.16845 9.604739 0.0000 
FDI 245.0446 141.8223 1.727828 0.0931 
DS -10.34520 11.09046 -0.932801 0.3575 
TR -2.535553 11.46195 -0.221215 0.8262 
R-squared 0.789502    
Adjusted R-squared 0.764738    
Sum squared residual 4766474    
 
Table 2: Tests of structural change for all periods 
 
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1990 1995  
Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
Varying regressors: All equation variables 
Equation Sample: 1973 2011 
   
F-statistic (Chow) 2.895515 Prob. F(10,24) 0.0160 
 
The results of the pooled regression model show that the selected explanatory variables explain 
about 76% of the variation in real GDP with coefficients of DI and FDI being significant at 10% 
level. Test of structural change given in Table 2 reject the hypothesis of no structural change11. 
This implies the existence of a structural break in economic performance of the Rwandan 
economy between 1973 and 2011. It establishes the fact that the two regimes and the period of 
conflict and genocide were individually unique in explaining economic performance of Rwanda. 
In particular, it confirms the popular view that conflict and genocide were disruptive and very 
destructive to the Rwandan economy.  
 
5.2  Structural break for pre and post genocide periods  
Since the period of conflict and genocide proved to be disruptive and destructive; its 
observations were dropped. Consequently, the pooled mo el and structural break tests for the 
“pre” and “post” genocide periods were carried out and the results are presented in Tables 3 and 
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 Given the three partitions, the same F-statistic using RSS is also given by the formula  
( ) ( )1* 3
3
( ) / 3 (4766474-2160232) /10
3 , 3 =  2. 8955
/( 3 ) 2160232 / 24
RSS RSS k k
F k k n k
RSS n k
− −
− − = =
−
 




Table 3: The pooled regression estimates for pre and post genocide periods 
 
Dependent Variable: GDP 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 134 
Included observations: 34 
    
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -1598.409 463.3489 -3.449688 0.0017 
DI 189.2122 26.60129 7.112897 0.0000 
FDI 262.7998 147.7858 1.778248 0.0859 
DS -25.43034 17.53248 -1.450471 0.1577 
TR 9.433151 16.20374 0.582159 0.5650 
R-squared 0.799229    
Adjusted R-squared 0.771536    
Sum squared residual 4328217.    
 
 
Table 4: Tests of structural change for pre and post genocide periods 
Chow Breakpoint Test: 18  
Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
Varying regressors: All equation variables 
Equation Sample: 1 34    
   
F-statistic (Chow) 4.817229 Prob. F(5,24) 0.0034 
 
     
With the removal of the conflict and genocide period, the results of the pooled model for the pre 
and post periods are comparable to those for the entire period. The coefficient of determination is 
77% while DI and FDI remain significant at the 10% level. The F test in Table 4 shows that there 
has been a structural change in Rwandan economic performance before and after the period of 
conflict and genocide12. This implies that even without the conflict and genocide, the two 
regimes were uniquely different in their pursuit of policies towards economic growth. Most 
importantly, the omission of observations for the conflict and genocide period did not bring 
about stability in the (pooled) regression model, suggesting therefore that the impact of conflict 
and genocide was transitory (temporary) without permanent ramifications to the Rwandan 
economy. This may largely be explained by the interventions and policies adopted by post 
genocide leadership to develop, pacify and unite the people of Rwanda through economic 
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 The F-statistic from the RSS formula is also given as 
( ) 1* 3
3
( ) / (4328217-2160232) / 5
, 2 =  4.817
/( 2 ) 2160232 / 24
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5.3 Sources of Structural breaks for pre and post genocide periods 
 
We now examine models which identify possible sources of structural break for the two regimes 
to determine whether it was due to difference in intercepts, slope vectors, or some combination 
of both.  
 
The fixed effects model 
 
This model was estimated and used to test for differences in intercepts related to the two regimes 
which emanate from the non-rejection of the null hypothesis of “no structural change”.  The 
results of the estimation and tests are presented i Tables 5 and 6. 
 
Table 5: Estimation of fixed effects model for pre and post genocide regimes 
 
Dependent Variable: GDP 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample: 117 
Sub-samples included: 2 
Total observations (balanced): 34
    
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C(1)D1 -1102.237 580.2518 -1.899583 0.0678 
C(2)D2 -675.6508 807.9571 -0.836246 0.4101 
C(3)DI 152.6730 37.19170 4.105028 0.0003 
C(4) FDI 364.4985 163.0151 2.235980 0.0335 
C(5) DS 0.054156 25.24189 0.002145 0.9983 
C(6) TR 0.581138 17.18872 0.033809 0.9733 
R-squared 0.812080    
Adjusted R-squared 0.778523    
Sum squared residual 4051165    
 
 
Table 6: Tests of differential intercepts for pre and post genocide regimes 
 
Wald Test: 
Null Hypothesis: C(1)=C(2) 
   
Test Statistic Value Df Probability 
F-statistic  1.914873 (1, 28)  0.1774 
 
Although the adjusted 2R is high (78%) and the coefficients of DI and FDI are significant at 5% 
level, the estimates of the fixed effects model show that the intercepts (constant term) for the two 
regimes are insignificant. The F-test suggests that the basic unobserved qualitative characteristics 
of variables which spurred growth in Rwanda (infrastructure, institutions, etc.) have not changed 
significantly in both regimes13.   
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 The F-test for differential intercepts for this model may also be obtained from the dummy variable model with a 
common intercept. Using RSS, the F- statistic is also estimated as( ) (4328217-4051165) /11,28  1.9149
4051165 / 28
F = =  




Separate Regression Model  
The combined separate regression model is a powerful model for carrying out most of the 
structural stability tests (save for tests of differential intercepts) especially for   balanced sub-
samples of observations. Since the observations for the two regimes are equal, the separate 
regression model was estimated and used to test for dif e ential slope vectors and stability of 
sub-set of coefficients. The results are presented i  the ensuing tables  
 
Table 7: Estimation of separate regression model for pre and post genocide regimes 
 
Dependent Variable: GDP 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample: 1: 17 
Sub-samples included: 2 
Total observations (balanced): 34
    
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C(1) D1 -9.660419 693.4943 -0.013930 0.9890 
C(2) D2 -2521.160 925.7656 -2.723324 0.0119 
C(3) D1DI 134.0523 44.07771 3.041271 0.0056 
C(4) D2DI 60.27472 46.06557 1.308455 0.2031 
C(5) D1FDI 360.1830 300.9254 1.196918 0.2430 
C(6) D2FDI 77.76220 162.5354 0.478432 0.6367 
C(7) D1DS -24.29816 28.72506 -0.845887 0.4060 
C(8) D2DS 35.58846 31.59200 1.126502 0.2711 
C(9) D1TR -20.90791 17.81737 -1.173456 0.2521 
C(10) D2TR 103.3020 29.01821 3.559904 0.0016 
R-squared 0.899794    
Adjusted R-squared 0.862217    
Sum squared residual 2160232.    
 
Test of differential slope vectors   
 
The Test of differential slope vectors given in Table 8 is found to be statistically significant 
implying that the differences in slope vectors were responsible for structural break in the pre and 
post genocide regimes in Rwanda.14  This suggests policies which led to changes in the 
explanatory variables (DI, FDI, DS and TR) impacted differently on the economic performance 





                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
14
 The F-statistic derived from the RSS of respective models is also computed as 
 
( ) (4051165-2160232) / 44,24  5.252
2160232 / 24
F = =  
 




Table 8: Test of differential slope vectors for pre and post genocide regimes 
 
Wald Test:  (Equality of Slope  Vectors) 
Null Hypothesis: C(3)=C(4),C(5)= C(6), C(7)=C(8),C(9)=C(10) 
   
Test Statistic Value Df Probability 
F-statistic  5.252029 (4, 24)  0.0035 
 
Tests of subset of coefficients 
 
The test for differential subset of coefficients examines variation of variables which matter most 
in explaining structural breaks. It analyses changes in combinations of variables (intercept 
inclusive) in the model in order to establish those which contribute the bulk to structural change. 
Among the several models explored, the following were identified and tested: 
 
(i) DS and TR were held constant while the intercept, DI and FDI were allowed to 
vary in both regimes. The results are presented in Table 9. 
 
Table 9: Test of subset of coefficients assuming DS and TR are constant 
 
Wald Test: 
Null Hypothesis: C (7) =C (8), C (9) =C (10) 
   
Test Statistic Value Df Probability 
F-statistic  9.67949215 (2, 24)  0.0008 
 
(ii)  The intercept, DI and FDI were assumed to be constant when DS and TR were 
varying in both regimes. Table 10 shows the results.  
 
Table 10: Test of subset of coefficients assuming intercept, DI and FDI are constant 
 
Wald Test: 
Null Hypothesis: C(1)=C(2),C(3)=C(4),C(5)= C(6) 
   
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
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 The RSS formula counterpart for the F-statistic is : ( ) (3902727-2160232) / 22,24  9.6795
2160232 / 24
F = =  
16
 The F-statistic for this test is also computed as:( ) (3256067-2160232) / 33,24  4.0582
2160232 / 24
F = =  




(iii)  The intercept, DS and TR were held constant while DI and FDI were made to 
vary in both regimes. The results are given in Table 11.  
 
 
Table 11: Test of subset of coefficients assuming intercept, DS and TR are constant 
 
Wald Test: 
Null Hypothesis: C (1) =C (2), C (7) =C (8), C (9) =C (10) 
   
Test Statistic Value Df Probability 
F-statistic  6.56703317 (3, 24)  0.0021 
 
Although the test of the three model possibilities of subset of coefficients investigated above are 
statistically significant, the comparative F-result suggest that the bulk of the difference in the 
models across the two regimes is explained more by changes (variations) in the intercept, DI and 
FDI as given in (i). 
 
5.4 Structural change with unequal error variances for the two regimes. 
The “pre” and “post” genocide regimes can be considere  heteroscedastic since they are distinct 
in their own rights in terms of policies, politics, management, etc. Under this assumption 
(conviction), the Chow test previously computed to test for structural change no longer applies 
since the error variances for the two regimes will not be homogeneous. With heteroscedasticity, 
the Wald test of structural for the two regimes is a 2χ  statistic with 5 degrees of freedom 
computed as18  

































                                                          
17
 The RSS formula counterpart is:( ) (3933521-2160232) / 33,24  6.567
2160232 / 24
F = =  
18
 Note that E-Views versions 7.0 computes the same results as we obtained.  
 





158858.154973364 -7953.09814498412 11031.1781153038 1368.36788453245 -2096.35681945381
-7953.09814498412 641.743765358803 -776.773797781384 -107.389886639012 17.75812075532 1
ˆ 11031.1781153038 -776.77379778=V 13 4 29911.7265131599 1229.00610995306 -1096.17713347629
1368.36788453245 -107.389886639012 1229.00610995306 272.549668017994 -83.4728483976765
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1430992.99188134 -24785.2242006616 139640.315678823 24339.0868063531 -30454.4288527316
-24785.2242006616 3543.14028312361 -3244.78176561161 -912.593768633572 -990.072509132898
ˆ 139640.315678823 -3244.78176=V 561161 44109.4476703148 -1002.86084897146 -3152.53342875765














On the basis of the p-value of 0.000464173, the Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of equality 
of coefficient vectors in the two regimes. This supports our earlier finding of the existence of 
structural break using the Chow test. This notwithstanding, it should be noted that the Wald test 




This paper analysed the real GDP as a measure of economic performance in Rwanda between 
1973 and 2011. During this period, the country underwent through three distinct historical 
phases: the pre-genocide period (1973-1989), the period of conflict and genocide (1990-1994); 
and the post-genocide period (1995-2011). The variables considered to be the main drivers of 
real GDP were: domestic investment (DI), foreign direct investment (FDI), domestic savings 
(DS) and trade (TR); all expressed as percentages of GDP.  
 
The period of conflict and genocide was very disruptive and destructive for all the variables 
studied. On the average, real GDP doubled in the post-genocide periods compared to the pre-
genocide periods. This change may be attributed to policies and programs adopted by the 
Government in the implementation of EDPRS and Vision 2020. DI and FDI were also relatively 
high in the post-genocide periods due to measures government undertook to attract and promote 
domestic and foreign investment. However, DS and TR have remained low and more or less of 
the same magnitude without any clear difference in them between the two regimes.   
 
The pooled, the fixed effects and the separate regression models were used to analyze structural 
change/break in the economic performance. Chow test rejects the null hypothesis of no structural 
change for all the periods. The Chow test also rejects the null hypothesis for the pre and post 
genocide periods after the omission of conflict and genocide period observations. Furthermore, 
the Wald test of structural change under heterogeneity of the two regimes corroborated the 
rejection of the null hypothesis. The rejection of the null hypothesis suggests that the 
disequilibrium impact of conflict and genocide was temporary on the Rwandan economy. This 
may be explained by the interventions and policies initiated by post genocide leadership to 
develop, pacify and unite (reconciliation, inclusion & non-discrimination) the people of Rwanda.  




Although structural change was established for the pre and post genocide periods, the source of 
the change is attributed to slope vectors but not simple shifts in the intercepts. This implies the 
policies which led to changes in the explanatory variables (DI, FDI, DS and TR) impacted 
differently on the economic performance of the two regimes. It also suggests that the unobserved 
qualitative characteristics of variables which spur growth in Rwanda (infrastructure, institutions, 
etc.) did not change significantly in both regimes. Finally, tests on subsets of coefficients found 
that the bulk of the difference in the models across the two regimes was explained mainly by 
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